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A Ryerson lecturer is supposed to tell the audience what he or she has
been doing to earn a living from the University. Therefore it is an appro-
priate occasion for me to review what is known about human capital,
especially the progress during the quarter-century since I published a
book with that title. What has been called the human capital "revolu-
tion" began about three decades ago. Its pioneers include Ted Schultz,
Jacob Mincer, Milton Friedman, Sherwin Rosen, and several others asso-
ciated with the University of Chicago.
To most of you, capital means a bank account, one hundred shares of
IBM, assembly lines, or steel plants in the Chicago area (especially dur-
ing a Ryerson lecture). These are all forms of capital in the sense that
they yield income and other useful outputs over long periods of time.
But I am going to talk about a different kind of capital. Schooling, a
computer training course, expenditures on medical care, and lectures
on the virtues of punctuality and honesty are capital too in the sense that
they improve health, raise earnings, or add to a person's appreciation of
1 I appreciate the helpful comments of Guity Nashat, Sherwin Rosen, and George Stigler
and the assistance of David Meltzer.
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literature over much of his or her lifetime. Consequently, it is fully in
keeping with the capital concept as traditionally denned to say that ex-
penditures on education, training, medical care, etc., are investments in
capital. However, these produce human, not physical or financial, capital
because you cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills,
health, or values the way it is possible to move financial and physical
assets while the owner stays put. This embodiment of human capital in
people is depressingly illustrated by the reactions of Hong Kong resi-
dents to the takeover of Hong Kong in 1997 by China. Many local people
are busy protecting against China's policies by selling off some of their
local financial and physical assets in order to invest in safer foreign secu-
rities and property. At the same time, however, computer experts, top
management, and other skilled personnel are leaving Hong Kong in
droves to seek citizenship elsewhere. They cannot reduce the risk to
their human capital from China by investing only part of the human
capital abroad; they must go where their capital goes.
It may seem odd now, but I hesitated a while before deciding to call
my book Human Capital—and even hedged the risk by using a long subti-
tle. In the early days, many people were criticizing this term and the
underlying analysis because they believed it treated people like slaves or
machines. My, how the world has changed! The name and analysis are
now readily accepted by most people not only in all the social sciences,
but even in the media. I was surprised when a few months ago Business
Week magazine had a cover story titled "Human Capital." And more
amazing still, this has been their most popular cover story in several de-
cades.
However, I should add that the concept of human capital remains sus-
pect within academic circles that organize their thinking about social
problems around a belief in the exploitation of labor by capital. It is easy
to appreciate the problems created for this view by the human capital
concept. For if capital exploits labor, does human capital exploit labor
too—in other words, do some workers exploit other workers? And are
skilled workers and unskilled workers pitted against each other in the
alleged class conflict between labor and capital? If governments are to
expropriate all capital to end such conflict, should they also expropriate
human capital, so that governments would take over ownership of work-
ers as well?
You can see why an idea developed to understand the economic and
social world has been thrust into ideological discussions. Yet the concept
of human capital has been popular in Communist countries. My book
and those by Schultz and others on human capital are extensively used
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reforms, economists and planners there had no trouble with the concept
of investing capital in people.
I will try to avoid technical analysis and jargon, and concentrate on
showing how the analysis of investments in human capital helps in un-
derstanding a large and varied class of behavior not only in the Western
world, but also in developing countries and countries with very different
cultures. My discussion follows modern economics and assumes that
these investments usually are rational responses to a calculus of expected
costs and benefits.
2. Education and Training
Education and training are the most important investments in human
capital. My book showed, and so have many other studies since then,
that high school and college education in the United States greatly raise
a person's income, even after netting out direct and indirect costs of
schooling, and after adjusting for the better family backgrounds and
greater abilities of more educated people. Similar evidence is now avail-
able for many points in time from over one hundred countries with dif-
ferent cultures and economic systems. The earnings of more educated
people are almost always well above average, although the gains are gen-
erally larger in less-developed countries. Consider the differences in av-
erage earnings between college and high school graduates in the United
States during the past fifty years. After being reasonably stable at be-
tween 40 and 50 percent until the early 1960s, they rose during that
decade and then fell rather sharply. This fall during the 1970s led some
economists and the media to worry about "overeducated Americans"
(see Freeman, 1976). The concept of human capital itself fell into
some disrepute.
But as Kevin Murphy and Finis Welch document in a recent study
(1989), the monetary gains from a college education rose sharply during
the 1980s to the highest level during these fifty years. The earnings ad-
vantage of high school graduates over high school dropouts also in-
creased. Talk about overeducated Americans has vanished, and it has
been replaced by concern once more about whether the United States
provides adequate quality and quantity of education and other training.
These concerns are stimulated by tough economic competition from
a renewed Europe, Japan, Korea, and other Asian countries, by sluggish
rates of productivity advance in the United States during the past fifteen
years, by a large drop in SAT scores, and by the dismal performance of
American high school students on international tests in mathematics.18 HUMAN CAPITAL REVISITED
For those who prefer a monetary bottom line, trends in the earnings
of young persons in the United States provide good reason for concern
about the preparation they are receiving. The trend has been disastrous
for the 15 percent of all students and much larger percentage of inner-
city blacks who fail to complete high school. Their real wage rates have
fallen by more than 30 percent since the early 1970s. Whether because
of school problems, family instability, or other forces, young people with-
out a college education are not being adequately prepared for work in
modern economies.
A Labor Department commission on labor quality, of which I am a
member, is considering what can be done to improve the quality of work-
ers in the United States. The concerns that led to the creation of this
commission have stimulated renewed academic interest in the analysis
of human capital, which illustrates how research in social sciences re-
sponds, sometimes excessively, to public policy issues.
The fraction of high school graduates who entered college fell during
the middle of the seventies when benefits from a college education
dropped, and it rose again in the eighties when the benefits greatly in-
creased. This caused an unexpected boom in college enrollments dur-
ing the past few years, despite the relatively few people who are reaching
college age. So, alas, the large rise in applications to our College in re-
cent years is not due solely to more widespread appreciation of the su-
perb education it provides. Many educators expected enrollments in the
eighties to decline not only for demographic reasons, but also because
college tuition was rising rapidly. They were wrong because they failed
to appreciate that benefits from college rose even faster than costs, and
that high school graduates respond to changes in both benefits and
costs.
One might believe that enrollments in college would be easy to pre-
dict since the number of persons graduating from high school can be
predicted quite closely. But demographic-based college enrollment fore-
casts have been wide of the mark during the past twenty years, as Steve
Stigler and I, especially Steve, showed in a subcommittee report a few
years ago to the Baker Commission. Such forecasts ignored the changing
incentives to women, blacks, and older persons to enroll in college.
That human capital investments tend to respond rationally to benefits
and costs is clearly indicated by changes in the education of women.
Prior to the 1960s in the United States, women were more likely than
men to graduate from high school but less likely to continue on to col-
lege. Women shunned math, sciences, economics, and law, and gravi-
tated toward teaching, home economics, foreign languages, and litera-
ture. Since relatively few married women continued to work for pay, theyEDUCATION AND TRAINING 19
rationally chose an education that helped in household production and
no doubt also in the marriage market. All this has changed radically.
The enormous increase in the participation of married women is the
most important labor force change during the past twenty-five years.
Many women now take little time off from their jobs even to have chil-
dren. As a result, the value to women of market skills has increased enor-
mously, and they are shunning traditional "women's fields" to enter ac-
counting, law, medicine, engineering, and other subjects that pay well.
Indeed, women now comprise one-third or so of enrollments in law,
business, and medical schools, and many home economics departments
have either shut down or are emphasizing the "new home economics,"
which is a true branch of economics.
The same trends in women's education are found in Great Britain,
France, Scandinavia, Taiwan, Japan, Mexico, and other countries with
large increases in the labor force participation of women, even when
attitudes toward women differ greatly from those now prevalent in Eu-
rope and the United States. Whenever the labor force participation of
married women has increased sharply, changes in the gains from work
for pay have had a more powerful effect on the behavior of women than
have traditional ideas about the proper role of women.
Job opportunities for women at first improved slowly as they started
to move up in business and the professions during the past several de-
cades. But the trend accelerated sharply after the late 1970s. The ratio
of the earnings of full-time working women and men has increased more
rapidly since 1979 than during any previous period in our history, and
women are becoming much more prominent in many highly skilled
jobs. Improvements in the economic position of black women have been
especially rapid, and they now earn just about as much as white women.
Although the civil rights movement clearly contributed to greater job
opportunities for women and other minorities, it is far from the whole
story. This can be seen from the fact that women progressed most rapidly
under the Reagan administration, which was opposed to affirmative ac-
tion and did not have an active Civil Rights Commission. In my judg-
ment, women advanced primarily because of their greater attachment
to the labor force. This in turn was stimulated by a large decline in fertil-
ity, a rapid increase in divorce, and the growing importance of the ser-
vice sector. Human capital analysis assumes that schooling raises earn-
ings and productivity mainly by providing knowledge, skills, and a way
of analyzing problems. An alternative view, however, denies that school-
ing does much to improve productivity, and instead it stresses "creden-
tialism"—that degrees and education convey information about the un-
derlying abilities, persistence, and other valuable traits of people.20 HUMAN CAPITAL REVISITED
According to extreme versions of this line of analysis, earnings of, for
example, college graduates exceed those of high school graduates not
because college education raises productivity, but because more produc-
tive students go on to college.
Credentialism obviously exists. But many kinds of evidence suggest
that credentialism does not explain most of the positive association be-
tween earnings and schooling.
The main problem with credentialism is that companies do not want
information on success at schoolwork, but on abilities and performance
in the context of working life: the discipline imposed by factories, the
need to please customers and get along with fellow employees, and so
forth. Success in the flexible, individualistic, and rather undisciplined
university atmosphere in most countries and in high schools in the
United States does not convey much relevant information. I tell my
classes that eccentrics and nuts can last much longer as students than as
workers, and they respond that the same is true of professors.
A cheaper and more efficient way to provide information to employ-
ers is for teenagers to enter directly into the labor force, as they did
prior to the industrial revolution. Far more would be learned about their
work-related abilities and other characteristics after six years of work ex-
perience than after six additional years of schooling. High school and
college education has spread extensively in modern economies because
the additional knowledge and information acquired in school is so im-
portant in technologically advanced economies. I should add that advo-
cates of the credentialism approach have become rather silent in recent
years with the growing concerns about schools and labor quality in the
United States.
Of course, learning and training also occur outside of schools, espe-
cially on jobs. Even college graduates are not well prepared for the labor
market when they leave school, and they are fitted into their jobs
through formal and informal training programs. The amount of on-the-
job training ranges from an hour or so at simple jobs like dishwashing
to several years at complicated tasks like engineering in an auto plant.
The limited information available indicates that on-the-job training is an
important source of the very large increase in earnings as workers gain
greater experience at work. And recent bold estimates by Jacob Mincer
suggest that the total investment in on-the-job training may be almost as
large as the investment in education.
After a few years of frequent job changes, most workers settle down
and remain with the same company for a long time. Workers and their
employers get bonded together in large part because of the on-the-job
learning and training. Therefore, it is not surprising that job changesHUMAN CAPITAL AND THE FAMILY 21
are common among unskilled workers and uncommon among skilled
workers. It also appears that job changes are much less frequent in Japan
than in the United States mainly because on-the-job investments in work-
ers are greater in Japan. My friends in the humanities like Dick Stern
may complain that so far I have only mentioned "money," or they might
say "mere money." Is there any place in human capital theory for educa-
tion to appreciate literature, culture and the good life? Fortunately,
nothing in the concept of human capital implies that monetary incen-
tives need be more important than cultural and nonmonetary ones.
Obviously, it is much easier to quantify the monetary side, but, never-
theless, progress has been made on other aspects. Many studies show
that education promotes health, reduces smoking, raises the propensity
to vote, improves birth control knowledge, and stimulates the apprecia-
tion of classical music, literature, and even tennis. In an ingenious study
that relies heavily on economic theory, Bob Michael (1972) quantifies
some non-monetary benefits of education. His results and those of oth-
ers indicate that such benefits of schooling are quite large, although for
most people they are apparently smaller than monetary benefits.
3. Human Capital and the Family
No discussion of human capital can omit the influence of families on
the knowledge, skills, values, and habits of their children. Parents who
severely beat their children cause lasting damage, while at the other end
of the spectrum, sympathetic and firm parents help motivate their
children.
Large differences among young children grow over time with age and
schooling because children learn more easily when they are better pre-
pared. Therefore, even small differences among children in the prepara-
tion provided by their families are frequently multiplied over time into
large differences when they are teenagers. This is why the labor market
cannot do much for school dropouts who can hardly read and never
developed good work habits, and why it is so difficult to devise policies
to help these groups.
Parents have a large influence on the education, marital stability, and
many other dimensions of their children's lives. The term "underclass"
describes families in which low education, welfare dependence, early
pregnancy, and marital instability pass from parents to children. In light
of this, it is rather surprising that although earnings of parents and chil-
dren are positively related, the relation is not strong. For example, if
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their generation, the children's earnings tend to be less than 6 percent
above the mean of their own generation. Earnings of parents and chil-
dren appear to be a little more strongly related when parents are poorer.
It is easy to see why children's and parents' earnings may be closer in
poorer families. Richer families can pay for the training of their chil-
dren, including the earnings foregone when children spend time in
training rather than at work. Many poorer parents would be willing to
lend their children money to help them obtain further training if the
parents could expect to get paid back later when they are old. But chil-
dren may not carry out their part of the bargain, especially in highly
mobile societies where children often live far from their parents.
One solution is for governments to lend money to students when their
parents are unable or unwilling to finance the training. The federal gov-
ernment has developed an extensive loan program to help students fi-
nance college education. Unfortunately the program has serious flaws,
including low caps on the maximum amounts that can be borrowed,
misplaced and excessive subsidies, and shockingly high default rates. In
addition to explicit loans, some direct subsidies to schools may, in effect,
also be "loans" to students which they repay later with taxes that help
finance support for the elderly. By combining publicly subsidized school-
ing with a social security system, countries may have found a very crude
and indirect, but perhaps reasonably effective, way to provide loans to
children that get repaid when the parents are old and collect retirement
benefits (see Becker and Murphy, 1988).
Families divide their total spending on children between number of
children and the amount spent per child. The number of children and
spending per child tend to be negatively related. The reason is simple.
An increased number of children raises the effective cost of adding to
the spending on each child, because an additional dollar or hour of
time spent on each child then means a larger total addition to spending.
Similarly, an increase in the dollars or time spent on each child raises
the cost of having an additional child. Consequently, even a modest tax
on births can have a large negative effect on the number of children
and a large positive effect on the amount spent on each child.
China imposed heavy, not modest, taxes and other penalties on large
families during the past decade, especially in urban areas. It is revealing
about the cross-cultural relevance of this analysis that sharp declines in
urban fertility have been accompanied by discussions in the Chinese
press of the "emperor child." This refers to only children who receive
lavish toys and presents from their parents, and are pushed toward out-
standing educational achievement.
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and spending per child implies a close and also usually negative relation
at the aggregate level between population growth and investments in
human capital. Differences among ethnic groups in the United States
are fascinating. Groups with small families generally spend a lot on each
child's education and training, while those with big families spend much
less. The Japanese, Chinese, Jews, and Cubans have small families and
the children become well educated, while Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and
blacks have big families and the education of children suffers. (I should
add that the Mormons are an interesting exception, for they have both
very large families and high levels of achievement). It should come as
no surprise that children from the ethnic groups with small families and
large investments in human capital typically rise faster and further in
the United States' income-occupation hierarchy than do children from
other groups.
Malthus' famous prediction that people marry earlier and birth rates
rise when incomes increase was decisively contradicted by the industrial
revolution, whose effects became evident only shortly after publication
of the second edition of his book on population. This is a common para-
dox: a great book gets contradicted by events not long after publication.
The contradiction to Malthus' theory is that fertility fell sharply, rather
than rose, as per capita incomes grew in Great Britain, the United States,
France, Germany, Sweden, and other Western countries. Rapid advances
in education and other training accompanied the sharp declines in fer-
tility. Parents did spend more on children when their incomes rose—as
Malthus predicted—but they spent a lot more on each child and had
fewer children, as human capital theory predicts.
Similar changes occur in other cultures when they experience rapid
economic growth. Taiwan's birth rate was cut in half from 1960 to 1975,
while the fraction of high school graduates doubled after Taiwan took
off in the 1960s toward its remarkable economic growth. Mexico's birth
rate did not fall much during its rapid economic growth in the 1950s
and 1960s. But since 1975 birth rates have fallen by more than one-third,
and school enrollments have expanded rapidly.
4. Human Capital and Economic Development
Economic analysis has no trouble explaining why, throughout history,
few countries have experienced very long periods of persistent growth
in income per person. For if per capita income growth is caused by the
growth of land and physical capital per worker, diminishing returns
from additional capital and land eventually eliminate further growth.24 HUMAN CAPITAL REVISITED
The puzzle, therefore, is not the lack of growth, but the fact that the
United States, Japan, and many European countries have had continu-
ing growth in per capita income during the past one hundred years
and longer.
Presumably, the answer lies in the expansion of scientific and techni-
cal knowledge that raises the productivity of labor and other inputs in
production. The systematic application of scientific knowledge to pro-
duction of goods has greatly increased the value of education, technical
schooling, and on-the-job training as the growth of knowledge has be-
come embodied in people—in scientists, scholars, technicians, manag-
ers, and other contributors to output.
It is clear that all countries which have managed persistent growth in
income have also had large increases in the education and training of
their labor forces. First, elementary school education becomes universal,
then high school education spreads rapidly, and finally children from
middle income and poorer families begin going to college. A skeptic
might respond that the expansion in education as countries get richer
no more implies that education causes growth than does a larger num-
ber of dishwashers in richer countries imply that dishwashers are an en-
gine of growth.
However, even economists know the difference between correlation
and causation, and have developed rather straightforward methods for
determining how much of income growth is caused by a growth in hu-
man capital. In an excellent study for the United States, Edward Denison
(1985) finds that the increase in schooling of the average worker be-
tween 1929 and 1982 explains about one-fourth of the rise in per capita
income during this period. He is unable to explain much of the re-
maining growth. I like to believe that this is mainly because he cannot
measure the effects on earnings of improvements over time in health,
on-the-job training, and other kinds of human capital.
The outstanding economic records of Japan, Taiwan, and other Asian
economies in recent decades dramatically illustrate the importance of
human capital to growth. Lacking natural resources—e.g., they import
practically all their sources of energy—and facing discrimination from
the West, these so-called Asian tigers grew rapidly by relying on a well-
trained, educated, hard-working, and conscientious labor force. It surely
is no accident, for example, that Japan's system of lifetime employment
at large companies originated after World War II when they began to
upgrade their technology rapidly partly by investing heavily in the train-
ing of employees. The lifetime system is not explained just by the tradi-
tional Japanese culture that emphasizes loyalty toward groups, for job
changes in Japan were frequent during the first half of this century (see
Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985).CONCLUSIONS 25
Compelling evidence of the link between human capital and technol-
ogy comes from agriculture. Education is of little use in traditional agri-
culture because farming methods and knowledge are then readily
passed on from parents to children. Farmers in countries with tradi-
tional economies are among the least educated members of the labor
force. By contrast, modern farmers must deal with hybrids, breeding
methods, fertilizers, complicated equipment, and intricate futures mar-
kets for commodities. Education is of great value since it helps farmers
adapt more quickly to new hybrids and other new technologies (see
Welch, 1970). Therefore, it is no surprise that farmers are about as well
educated as industrial workers in modern economies.
Education and training is also helpful in coping with changing tech-
nologies and advancing productivity in the manufacturing and service
sectors. Recent studies show that more rapidly progressing industries do
attract better-educated workers and provide greater training on the job
(see Mincer and Higuchi, 1988; Gill, 1989).
5. Conclusions
We have reached the end of my visit. Perhaps I have succeeded in con-
veying the enormous energy devoted to the analysis of human capital
during the past quarter-century and the impressive advances of analyti-
cal techniques and the accumulation of empirical regularities. Much is
now known for many countries about the effects of education on earn-
ings, occupation, employment, and unemployment of both men and
women and various races and ethnic groups. Much too is known about
the link between birth rates and investments in education and training,
how families influence the human capital of their children, and the rela-
tion between investments in human capital and economic progress.
I indicated earlier that human capital analysis has been motivated
partly by a desire to evaluate proposals to improve the quality of the
work force through schooling, training, medical services, and child care.
But its main purpose as far as I am concerned is to remove a little of the
mystery from the economic and social world that we live in.
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Theoretical Analysis
"The most valuable of all capital is that
invested in human beings."
Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics